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Available online 8 November 2013This paper explores the implications of delays (to 2030) in implementing optimal policies for
long-term transition pathways to limit climate forcing to 450 ppm CO2e on the basis of the
AMPERE Work Package 2 model comparison study.
The paper highlights the critical importance of the period 2030–2050 for ambitious mitigation
strategies. In this period, the most rapid shift to low greenhouse gas emitting technology
occurs. In the delayed response emission mitigation scenarios, an even faster transition rate in
this period is required to compensate for the additional emissions before 2030. Our physical
deployment measures indicate that the availability of CCS technology could play a critical role
in facilitating the attainment of ambitious mitigation goals. Without CCS, deployment of other
mitigation technologies would become extremely high in the 2030–2050 period. Yet the
presence of CCS greatly alleviates the challenges to the transition particularly after the delayed
climate policies, lowering the risk that the long-term goal becomes unattainable.
The results also highlight the important role of bioenergy with CO2 capture and storage
(BECCS), which facilitates energy production with negative carbon emissions. If BECCS is
available, transition pathways exceed the emission budget in the mid-term, removing the
excess with BECCS in the long term. Excluding either BE or CCS from the technology portfolio
implies that emission reductions need to take place much earlier.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC-BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).Keywords:
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Technological implications of climate change mitigation
policies have been an important area of research for the
integrated assessment modeling (IAM) community. Previous
studies focused on the role of technology, particularly the
influence of technology availability on the cost of climate change
mitigation policies [1–5]. A fewmodel inter-comparison studies,
such as ADAM [6], RECIPE [7], and EMF27 [8], also explored thehis is an open access article urole of technology across a wide suite of IAMs, based on a
coordinated set of technology assumptions. They examined the
nature of energy system transformation under climate change
mitigation policies and the influence of technology availability
on mitigation costs and on the feasibility of meeting ambitious
climate goals.
The IAM studies agree that technology is indeed one of
the key components of climate change mitigation and
directly affects the attainability of low climate stabilization
[6–8]. They suggest that more and better performance of
the technology options available for mitigation leads to lower
cost of mitigation and a higher likelihood of achievingnder the CC-BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
2 The use of a cumulative CO2 emission budget reduces the uncertainty
that would be introduced if each modeling team were to employ its own
simple climate model and facilitates participation by groups that do not have
in-house atmosphere–climate models.
3 HST indicates “high short-term target,” which is the low-ambition
extrapolation of global greenhouse gas emissions levels from the pledges by
2020 under the 2010 Cancún Agreements [47].
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limiting climate change will undoubtedly require major
changes to the global energy system, which takes the form
of extensive deployment of new and existing low-carbon
technologies [1,7–9]. Thus the availability of technology has
the effect of shaping the optimal time path of emission
mitigation, that is, the relative degree of near-term and
longer-term emission reductions, which in turn influences
the cost of achieving the climate targets [4,8].
Technological aspects of long-term mitigation policies are
receiving renewed attention as current national emission
reduction pledges are not consistent with the reductions
required to meet the 2 °C target in a cost-minimizing way
[10]. Although previous studies have shown that a delay in
climate policy can result in substantial increases in mitigation
costs and even infeasibilities [7,11–16], there exists no single
model inter-comparison study that systematically explores
the role of technology under weak near-term climate policies
that are consistent with what is currently being discussed in
the international climate policy arena.
This study employs AMPERE WP2 scenarios to explore
this research gap [17]. Nine different IAMs with varying
representation of the energy–economy–climate system and
unique strengths participated in this study. All models
use coordinated assumptions about technology availability
and harmonized near- and long-term emission budgets
and population and economic developments to allow for a
comprehensive, relatively robust characterization of the role
of technology in achievingmeaningful climate stabilization in
the long term under weak near-term policies. We hypothe-
size that weaker-than-optimal near-term actions imply that
subsequent emission mitigation and energy system transfor-
mations will be forced to accelerate in subsequent years with
the responsiveness depending on the available emission
mitigation technology options.
The objective of this study is to investigate what
near-term climate policies may imply for technology deploy-
ment and longer-term emission pathways that achieve the
450 ppm CO2e target1 in 2100 under alternative technology
availability setups. The three sets of research questions
include:
1. How do less-than-optimal near-term emission mitigation
policies affect mid-term and long-term emission mitigation
requirements to achieve an end-of-century goal? How are
the resulting pathways affected by technology availability?
Wewill examine whether these variables become particular-
ly sensitive when specific technologies are excluded and1 The 450 ppm CO2e target is broadly consistent with limiting long-term
temperature change below 2 °C compared to pre-industrial levels [44],
which is called for by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [45]
and also regarded as a reasonable benchmark to avoid dangerous climate
change [46]. This is apparently an aspirational target as a globally
appropriate agreement with binding emission constraints to achieve the
target is not likely to be reached anytime soon. To allow for various analyses
related to mitigation costs and feasibility of achieving long-term targets, the
AMPERE exercise also includes scenarios achieving 550 ppm CO2e, which
represents lower climate ambition [17]. In this paper, however, we chose to
focus on the cases with the aspirational but meaningful target to highlight
the inﬂuence of near-termmitigation action on required long-term emission
mitigation and energy-system transformation, which tend to amplify as the
target gets more stringent.whether there is a critical set of technologies required to
achieve the long-term stabilization goal.
2. What are the physical requirements of the transitions
described in questions 1? For example, what are the land
requirements; howmanypower plants need to be built; and
what is the rate of capacity expansion? Are such transfor-
mations constrained by resource limits and how do they
compare to historical technology deployment rates?
3. How do specific IAM characteristics affect the above ques-
tions? We will attempt to explain the results by identify-
ing specific technologies on which different IAMs rely for
mitigation and the abilities of the IAMs to do large
technology upscaling or early retirement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief background on the study design and scenario set-up.
Section 3 explores long-term CO2 emission pathways toward
the 450 ppm CO2e target after the period of optimal or
delayed mitigation actions under various technology avail-
ability scenarios. Section 4 then examines the transformation of
the energy system with a particular emphasis on the character-
istics of technology deployment. Section 4.1 then discusses
the physical implications of such technology deployment, and
Section 4.2 offers conclusions.
2. Study design and scenario set-up
In this study, we employ a subset of AMPERE WP2
scenarios that is generally consistent with a concentration
target of 450 ppm CO2e (2.6 W/m2) in 2100, corresponding
to a cumulative emission budget over the period 2000 to
2100 of 1500 GtCO2.2 We combine this with two alternative
near-term climate policies through 2030 and five technology
sensitivity experiments.
The two near-term climate policies are:
1. Optimal short-term emissions (OPT) and
2. Emissions limited to 60.8 GtCO2e per year in 2030 (HST3).
Note that the OPT pathways are model-specific and that
the HST scenarios are calculated in terms of Kyoto green-
house gases [17].4 After the year 2030, models have full4 To meet aspirational warming goals, we need deep emission reductions
not only of Kyoto greenhouse gases—CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, HFCs, and PFCs—but
also of some non-Kyoto air pollutants—black carbon aerosols and tropo-
spheric ozone precursors. Reducing black carbon emissions in particular,
which could also be achieved from local air-quality measures, would help
decrease short-term net radiative forcing and thus result in lower global
warming for a few decades [49]. In the AMPERE exercise, however, we do
not examine the issue of accelerated action on air pollutants as a major near-
term strategy of achieving the long-term 450 ppm CO2e stabilization target.
One important consideration for this was that only ﬁve models out of the
nine participating models represent full greenhouse gases and radiative
agents, although eight models represent full Kyoto gases. So, we set the high
short-term target of 60.8 GtCO2e for those eight models with full Kyoto
gases. For the other two models, POLES and IMACLIM, that represent only
fossil and industrial CO2 emissions, the target has been set to 44.2 GtCO2 in
2030.
Table 1
Scenarios covered in this study and feasibilities (“NR” indicates not-reported scenarios, “INF” indicates infeasible scenarios, and “F” indicates feasible and reported
scenarios).
DNE21+ GCAM IMACLIM IMAGE MERGE-ETL MESSAGE POLES REMIND WITCH F and INF (count)
FullTech-OPT F F F F F F F F F 9/0
NucOff-OPT F F F F F F F F F 9/0
LimSW-OPT NR F NR F F F F F NR 6/0
LimBio-OPT NR F NR INF F F F F NR 5/1
NoCCS-OPT F F NR INF F F INF F INF 5/3
FullTech-HST F F INF INF F F F F F 7/2
NucOff-HST F F INF INF INF F F F F 6/3
LimSW-HST NR F INF INF F F F F NR 5/2
LimBio-HST NR F INF INF INF INF F F NR 3/4
NoCCS-HST F F INF INF INF INF INF INF INF 2/7
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as to achieve the cumulative emission budget.
Each of the above policy scenarios is examined in light
of five alternative technology performance-availability
assumptions [17]:
1) FullTech: all (model-specific) technologies are available
and can be fully deployed;
2) NucOff: nuclear power is phased out5;
3) LimSW: limited progress in solar and wind power technol-
ogy improvement;
4) LimBio: limited bioenergy supply availability; and
5) NoCCS: CO2 capture and storage technology is not allowed
to deploy.
The combination of the two near-term targets and the five
technology exclusion cases gives 10 possible scenarios for
each IAM.6
For this model comparison, nine IAMs have partici-
pated: DNE21+ [18], GCAM [19–21,22], IMACLIM [23,24],
IMAGE [15,25], MERGE-ETL [26,27], MESSAGE [28], POLES [29],
REMIND [30,31], and WITCH [32,33]. MERGE-ETL, MESSAGE,
REMIND, and WITCH are inter-temporal general equilibrium
models, IMACLIM is a recursive-dynamic general equilibrium
model, and DNE21+, GCAM, and POLES are recursive-dynamic
partial equilibrium models. All of the IAMs run through 2100,
except for DNE21+, which extends to 2050. Aside from the
solution approaches, the IAMs strongly differ in many other
aspects. For instance, not all of the participating IAMs incorpo-
rate all greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel and industrial
(FF&I) uses and land use changes. Specifically, IMACLIM and
POLES cover FF&I CO2 emissions only. The models also differ
widely in the representation and substitutability of technolo-
gies, which influences their ability to quickly transform the
energy system and meet long-term low stabilization targets.
The diagnostic study in this issue [34] evaluates the IAMs
in terms of emission responses to harmonized carbon prices,
reliance on carbon intensity reduction relative to energy
intensity reduction, and the rate of energy system transforma-
tion. Amore detailed description of the individual IAMs is given
in the overview paper of this issue [17].5 The NucOff scenario reﬂects a phase out of nuclear occurring after 2010
and incorporates plants that are under construction (but not planned or
proposed). Other technologies remain available as in FullTech.
6 Alternative energy efﬁciency scenarios are explored in the context of
carbon lock-ins in this issue [39].Note that not all IAMs reported all ten of the possible
scenarios (Table 1). The failure of the IAMs to report
scenarios is attributable to a wide range of factors, ranging
from technically not being able to find a solution, to having
found a solution but with the carbon price being “too high,”
to simply not attempting to run the scenario. As such,
individual modeling teams were required to report the
feasibilities of the scenarios that they were asked to run, by
indicating “NR” (not run) for the not-attempted scenarios,
“INF” (infeasible) for the scenarios that failed to solve or
generated an excessively high carbon price, and “F” (feasible)
for all other scenarios. 57 feasible scenarios out of 90 possible
scenarios were reported and used for the analysis. Note
that the number of IAMs that find a scenario feasible varies
widely among technology availability assumptions, so that
conclusions drawn from direct comparison across alternative
technology availability cases in this study may be subject
to sample selection bias. We will refer to Table 1 to discuss
feasibilities in various scenarios.
3. CO2 emission pathways toward 450 ppm CO2e
Achieving 450 ppm CO2e stabilization in 2100 requires
major changes in the global energy system. The character of
the transformation pathway reflects near-term climate policy
assumptions as well as the long-term goal [17]. To the extent
that the HST pathway undertakes less near-term emission
mitigation than the OPT pathway, it reduces the remaining
allowable emission budget.
3.1. Transition pathways with optimal near-term policies (OPT)
In the FullTech cases, bioenergy (BE) with CO2 capture
and storage (CCS) technology is available for all IAMs. The BE
and CCS (BECCS) technology combination facilitates energy
production with net CO2 removal from the atmosphere.
This in turn means that a fixed budget can be met through
“overshoot” pathways, in which the long-term target is
temporarily exceeded but eventually reduced to target levels
through BECCS.
In the FullTech-OPT scenarios, nearly all IAMs report negative
net global emissions by 2070 (Fig. 1). Negative emissionsmostly
come from BECCS and also terrestrial sequestration through
land-use change such as afforestation and soil carbon enhance-
ment. By 2050, emissions have been reduced to a small fraction
of reference levels.
Fig. 1. Mitigation of CO2 emissions relative to the baseline emissions. Gray funnel indicates the range of feasible OPT scenarios, and orange funnel indicates the
range of feasible HST scenarios. Values greater than 100% indicate negative net global CO2 emissions.
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and all report deployment of the technology in the
OPT-FullTech scenario, though the extent to which it is
deployed varies across models. Some IAMs, such as GCAM,
REMIND, and MESSAGE, report negative global emissions
facilitated by BECCS deployment (Fig. 1). Others, for example
POLES, deploy BECCS, but net global emissions remain
positive. In GCAM, BECCS is supplemented by terrestrial
carbon sequestration, which in turn is facilitated by carbon
prices which shift relative food prices resulting in dietary
shifts away from carbon-intensive activities, such as cattle,
and toward forests, soil carbon enhancement and bioenergy
production [35].
Limiting nuclear power or non-bioenergy renewables
with cost-effective near-term mitigation paths (the OPT
policy scenarios: NucOff-OPT or LimSW-OPT) does not
change the basic behavior of deep emission cuts in the long
run through negative emissions (Fig. 1).7 This is because
these technologies are only used for electricity production,
for which other low-carbon options are readily available [8].
Note that the NucOff and LimSW cases lead to greater
percentage reductions in the near-term and smaller percent-
age reductions in the long term relative to the full technology
availability case. This is because, with those technologies
excluded, the baseline scenarios present greater emissions7 BECCS technology is available in scenarios that limit nuclear power
(NucOff) or limit non-biomass renewable energy forms (LimSW).that accrue mostly in the long term, while the stabilization
scenarios lead to slightly greater emission reductions in the
near term and slightly less negative emissions in the long
term. However, overall differences in emission mitigation are
small relative to scenarios in which BECCS is unavailable.
Limiting BECCS in the OPT scenarios (NoCCS-OPT or
LimBio-OPT) has the effect of greatly reducing timing flexibility
in mitigation (Fig. 1). We find that emission mitigation is
shifted toward the present from the future, since the option to
“overshoot” the cumulative target and make up for it with
negative emissions late in the century is no longer available. By
contrast, the presence of the long-term negative emission
opportunity from BECCS technologies shifts emission mitiga-
tion to the future from the present.
Nonetheless, several scenarios still report negative
global emissions even in the OPT scenario without CCS
(NoCCS-OPT). This result is possible with terrestrial seques-
tration (DNE21+, GCAM, and MESSAGE) and, to a lesser
extent, the use of biological material in long-lived products
(GCAM). We also find that, compared with the case where
BECCS is fully available, mitigation pathways show smaller
variance across the models, although we begin to see fewer
models reporting scenarios—IMAGE becomes infeasible in
LimBio and NoCCS, and POLES and WITCH become infeasible
in the NoCCS scenario (Table 1).88 Three models, DNE21+, IMACLIM, and WITCH, did not attempt to run
either of these scenarios.
Fig. 2. 2000–2030 consumption of the 1500 GtCO2 budget (gray), remaining post-2030 CO2 budget (red), and budget expansion due to negative emission (green)
in the OPT and HST policy cases.
11 Although CCS was unavailable terrestrial sequestration was available in
both DNE21+ and GCAM, and GCAM also reported negative fossil fuel and
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policies (HST)
Two-thirds or more of the 1500 GtCO2 budget is
consumed in the 30 years between 2000 and 2030, and the
remainder in the subsequent 70 years (Fig. 2). The HST policy
cases all set an emission level of 60.8 GtCO2e in 20309 [17],
which corresponds to the low-ambition extrapolation of the
emission pledges by 2020 under the 2010 Cancún Agreements.
As this level is greater than any model reported for an OPT
scenario, emission mitigation in the HST scenarios is less than
optimal. As a consequence, models are forced to accelerate
emission mitigation in the years 2030–2050 (Figs. 1 and 3)
and/or deploy negative emission technologymore aggressively
(for example, DNE21+, GCAM, MERGE-ETL, REMIND, and
WITCH) (Fig. 2). The accelerated post-2030 transformation in
the energy system into low carbon technologies, as highlighted
in Fig. 3, invokes reductions in aggregate energy demand and
increases in mitigation costs.10
The degree to which the HST policy is suboptimal varies
across models. For GCAM, the difference is relatively small
(Fig. 2). In optimal mitigation pathway scenarios, GCAM under-
takes a large part of emission mitigation in the latter half of the
century through BECCS. As a result, GCAM significantly over-
shoots the long-term budget during the century. For all other
IAMs, particularly for WITCH and DNE21+, a larger portion of
the post-2030 emission budget is consumed due to the HST
policy as it would be optimal for them to conduct serious
emission mitigation earlier, given that they cannot significantly
overshoot the long-term target during the century while still
meeting the long-term target. The extreme case is IMACLIM,
where all HST scenarios become infeasible.
The ability to produce negative emissions has an important
role to play in HST scenarios in several models. For GCAM and
REMIND, in particular, the proportion of the post-2030 budgets
that are consumed as a consequence of the HST policy becomes9 For POLES and IMACLIM, which have only fossil and industrial CO2
emissions, the HST target has been set to 44.2 GtCO2 in 2030.
10 The overview paper [17] points out that mitigation costs increase for the
HST scenarios, relative to their OPT counterparts. These effects are
exaggerated when BECCS is limited.particularly high when BECCS is limited (LimBio-HST or
NoCCS-HST) (Fig. 2). Also, HST scenarios are associated with
higher costs particularly when BECCS is limited (see [17] for the
discussion on mitigation costs).
The extent of the technology portfolio was also important
in finding transition pathways. Seven of the nine modeling
teams reported the ability to meet the cumulative emission
budget under the HST constraint if all technology options,
including BECCS, were available. Limiting technology availability
increased the number of models that reported the case to be
“infeasible” (Table 1). When CCS was unavailable, only two
modeling teams—DNE21+ and GCAM—reported transition
pathways: both of them instead reported large-scale terrestrial
sequestration, which presents negative emissions.11
The important implication is that significant delay in
emission mitigation actions leads to negative emissions using
BECCS and/or terrestrial sequestration becoming a requirement
rather than a choice. Another important insight is that as we
delay more, the scale of required negative emissions increases,
posing a greater risk of failing to achieve the long-term climate
goal.3.3. Regional roles in transition pathways
Regional composition of CO2 emissions for each of the
reported scenarios is shown in Fig. 4.12 ASIA (China, India,
Southeast Asia, and Korea) accounts for the largest share of
emissions across all models, followed by the OECD90. The rest of
theworld (ROW) accounts for the smallest share.While regional
shares wax and wane across models and scenarios, variation is
relatively modest. This is likely due to the assumption that all
global regions initiate emissionmitigation simultaneously, face a
common price of carbon even in the near-term, and generallyindustrial emissions associated with the use of bioenergy in long-lived
materials, e.g. plastics.
12 The results of AMPERE exercise are shown at regional aggregations of
the world's ﬁve macro regions (OECD90, REF, ASIA, MAF, and LAM). The
deﬁnition of the regions is available at https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/
ene/AMPEREDB/.
Fig. 3. The shares of non-emitting primary energy supply that occurs for sequential periods beginning in 2010 for the OPT and HST policy in the FullTech
scenarios: Colored areas display the median of reporting models. Individual model shares by period are indicated by black lines showing variation across
individual models. The largest increase in the share of non-emitting primary energy occurs between 2030 and 2050, though the transformation continues
throughout the 21st century.
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the same near-term carbon price across regions distinguishes
this review from those that specify varying regional prices—such
as AMPERE Work Package 3 [36], LIMITS [37], and RoSE [38].
The HST policy results in higher cumulative emissions in
ASIA compared with the OPT case for DNE21+, POLES, and
REMIND, likely due to the relatively high near-term emissions
per unit of energy in ASIA. The trend is, however, reversed for
WITCH.14 Note that none of the IAMs have taken into account the complete list of
all potential silver bullets that are currently discussed. This is not only
because the development of such technologies is highly uncertain—thus
different models would have very different prospects—but also because the
AMPERE study, as a scenario exercise, intends to examine the interaction
between the availability of major technology options that are shared among4. Technology deployment toward 450 ppm CO2e
A detailed look at technology deployment to meet the
1500 GtCO2 21st century emission budget reveals four clear
findings:
• There is no “Silver Bullet.”13 No single technology delivers
the emission mitigation required to transform the energy
system from its reference pathway to one limiting cumu-
lative emissions to 1500 GtCO2 in the 21st century;
• There are multiple possible technology portfolios that can
transform the energy system from its reference pathway to
one limiting cumulative emissions to 1500 GtCO2 in the
21st century;
• The period 2030 to 2050 is critical for mitigation technology
deployment; and
• Foregoing or limitingmitigation technology options increases
reliance on the remaining technologies in the transformation
technology portfolio.
The remainder of this section elaborates these findings
one by one.13 A “Silver Bullet” technology is one which alone is sufﬁcient to achieve
emission mitigation goals at little or no cost.4.1. Full technology deployment
The comparison of the IAMs resoundingly suggests that there
is no “Silver Bullet” to the achievement of 450 ppm CO2e,
independent of the stringency of near-term actions (Fig. 5).14 A
broad range of supply- and demand-side responses is required to
make a major emission reduction, and their relative contribu-
tions vary among IAMs and over time.
The mitigation responses can be grouped into three inter-
related categories. The first response category, which is the
utmost concern of this paper, is the upscaling of low-carbon
technologies, such as, wind, solar, nuclear, bioenergy, and CCS
technologies including BECCS. While the IAMs deploy all
emission mitigation technologies to some degree if available,
they do differ in the relative contributions to emissions (Fig. 5).
GCAM responds by deploying BECCS in a large scale mostly after
2050, though BECCS remains a part of an emission mitigation
technology portfolio. The expansion of solar power is pro-
nounced in MERGE-ETL and MESSAGE even as early as in the
2030–2050 period, and REMIND has its rapid expansion seen
only after 2050. The second option is the premature retirement
of emitting sources, particularly coal-fired power plants. All IAMs
but IMAGE allow for such premature retirement (see Bertram et
al. [39] in this issue), and the option is exercised to a varyingthe IAMs and near-term policy actions, not to explore the entire space of
possible technology developments, which would in itself be an interesting
avenue for future research. In this regard, the no-silver-bullet argument may
be augmented with the assertion that even silver bullets were to emerge
they are very hard to guarantee, so that portfolio approach would be needed
anyway to hedge against the technological risks.
Fig. 4. Regional composition of emissions 2000 to 2100 for OECD90, ASIA, and the rest of the world (ROW).
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(Fig. 5). Although implementing various types of retirement
policies is a necessary step toward long-term energy system
transformation that is consistentwith the 2 °C target, in practice,
stranded capital assets and regional politics may pose significant
challenges. The last option, which is co-determined by the
availability and economics of the first two responses, is the
reduction in energy demand. IMACLIM and, to a lesser extent,
WITCH have net energy reductions during 2030–2050 as
non-bioenergy renewables do not become viable options until
then, that is, as a significant transformationof the energy sector is
limited. The model diagnostic study of this issue [40] points out2005-2030 20
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Fig. 5. The rate of deployment in global primary energy under FullTech-OPT (top
(bottom row) in the 2005-to-2030 (first column), 2030-to-2050 (second column),that IMACLIM and WITCH exhibit less reliance on carbon
intensity reductions relative to energy intensity reductions for
their mitigation strategies. Our results also confirm that the
relative contributions from these supply- and demand-side
mitigation responses, particularly in the 2030 to 2050 time
frame, are influenced by the level of near-term climate actions.
4.2. Technology deployment between 2030 and 2050
The 20 years between 2030 and 2050 are a period of
intensive transformation in energy systems to meet the 1500
GtCO2 21st century emission budget for both the OPT and HST30-2050 2050-2100
row) and excess deployment under HST relative to the FullTech-OPT case
and 2050-to-2100 time frames (third column).
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phasing out fossil capacities gets faster as existing capital stock
retires earlier than scheduled (except for IMAGE), while at the
same timemany of the low-carbon technologieswith decreasing
costs become viable options, both promoted by rising carbon tax
imposed on emitting sources. For example, BECCS technologies,
when available, are aggressively deployed, and even natural gas
and oil technologies start to phase out in many of the IAMs
between 2030 and 2050. The exception is GCAM,which presents
the greatest deployment of BECCS only after 2050. Remember
that DNE21+ runs only through 2050.
The period between 2030 and 2050 is particularly
important for the HST policy regimes. This 20-year period in
the HST policy case requires accelerated system transforma-
tion to compensate for the suboptimal emission mitigation
between 2010 and 2030, a period characterized by large-
scale deployment of emitting sources and little deployment
of CCS technologies (Figs. 3 and 5). All IAMs indicate that
most of the additional emissions in the 2010–2030 period are
produced by coal combustion, almost entirely by coal-fired
power plants.
The additional emission reductions between 2030 and 2050
come from all of the mitigation responses discussed above:
faster expansion in low-carbon technologies (bioenergy with
and without CCS and, to a lesser extent, solar, wind, and
nuclear power), faster retirement of emitting sources after
2030, and associated greater reductions in energy demand.
The results indicate that if any of these responses are
severely constrained in certain IAMs, their scenarios are
likely to be infeasible. For example, IMAGE and IMACLIM
have infeasibility even in the full technology availability case
because the former does not have the ability to rapidly retire
fossil capacities and the latter is already pushed to its limits
to fossil capacity retirement (and associated reductions in
energy demand). Johnson et al. [41] of this issue discusses
the relationship between near-term climate policy and
stranded coal capacity in the case of MESSAGE-MACRO
scenarios. Note that nearly all of the additional low-carbon
technology deployment and fossil capacity retirement are
made before 2050 for all feasible models, so that HST has no
noticeable effect on post-2050 deployment. This explains
why post-2050 emission pathways are similar for both OPT
and HST scenarios (Fig. 1). We discuss physical deployment
rates of low-carbon technologies in Section 4.1.
The accelerated 2030–2050 transformation in the HST policy
case necessarily involves extra costs. It leads to major reductions15 Our separation of the century-scale time frames—pre-2030, 2030–2050,
and post-2050—originates both from the design of AMPERE WP2 study and
from our ﬁndings about technology deployment. First, according to the
protocol of AMPERE WP2 study, during the ﬁrst stage up to 2030, global
emissions follow a trajectory toward the ﬁxed year-2030 target. As a result,
the amount of cumulative emissions and the associated emission mitigation
burden during the next stages will critically depend on the ﬁrst stage
emission pathway to 2030. This distinct set-up helps explicitly assess the
implications that near-term policy actions have for the attainability of long-
term climate goals and attendant technology upscaling requirement after
2030. Second, the separation before and after the year 2050 is from our
observation that, for the HST policy regimes, nearly all of the catch-up
deployment is made between 2030 and 2050 (see Figs. 3 and 5). Therefore, if
we had an alternative separation of the time frames, we might have not been
able to elicit robust ﬁndings related to technology deployment and emission
pathways after delayed policy actions, which is the main focus of this study.in energy demand relative to the optimal case (OPT) (Fig. 5). The
decreased energy demand can be translated into additional
losses of consumption or increased mitigation costs, and as the
post-2030 losses more than offset the near-term consumption
gains in the non-idealmitigation pathways, it eventually leads to
increased total policy costs in net present value terms (see [17]
for the discussion of policy costs) and infeasibilities in the cases
of IMACLIM and IMAGE.
4.3. The effect of technology limitations
Losing a technology option in the optimal policy case
(OPT) causes other available mitigation technologies to
expand earlier at a larger scale and/or fossil capacities to
phase out more rapidly, and weak near-term actions (HST)
require such technological responses to be implemented at
an even larger scale in the 2030–2050 period (see Figs. S1–S4
in the online supporting materials). When BECCS is limited, a
particularly rapid catch-up transformation occurs. In princi-
ple, the relative contributions of mitigation responses in the
individual IAMs depend on assumed technology performance
and cost, the degree to which technologies can substitute for
each other in the model, the timing of the phase out of fossil
capacities, and assumed or model-determined limits to the
speed at which new plant and equipment can deploy.
We consider limits on four technologies: (1) Nuclear power
(2) variable renewable electricity supply (wind and solar
power) (3) Bioenergy and (4) CCS. Each of these mitigation
technologies plays a different role in the energy system. The
first two technologies play an important role in providing
power generation. Bioenergy can be used either as a renewable
source of fuels, including transportation fuels, a feedstock for
power generation, and in combination with CCS, a means by
which carbon can be removed from the atmosphere. CCS can be
used in combination with any large emission source, including
power stations and industrial facilities, including cement
manufacturing. Thus, limitations on each of these will have
different repercussions for the overall emission mitigation
technology portfolio.
4.3.1. Nuclear phase out
The effect of no new construction of nuclear power plants
(NucOff-OPT) is relatively minor before 2030 because their
expansion is modest when the nuclear option is available
(Fig. 5). Furthermore, a large proportion of current plants and
those currently under construction will continue to operate
until then (Fig. S1). The effect on energy demand is fairly
limited as CCS-based fossil energy and renewables, which
would be anyway deployed at a large scale after 2030, expand
a little faster to compensate for the gradual decommissioning
of nuclear power plants. Also, weak near-term policies
(NucOff-HST) do not make its post-2030 technology deploy-
ment particularly different from the full technology availability
case (FullTech-HST).
4.3.2. Renewable energy limits
In the limited renewable scenario (LimSW-OPT), the major
impacts on the deployment of renewables are seen only after
2030, the period when renewables are to compete with other
low-carbon technologies (Fig. S2). MERGE-ETL, MESSAGE, and
REMIND show demand reductions after 2050, the periodwhen
Table 2
Median upscaling rates of nuclear, solar, and wind power between 2030 and 2050 (full ranges are indicated by the numbers within the brackets).
Region Tech Short-term
target (sample)
Nuclear power 2030–2050 Solar power 2030–2050 Wind power 2030–2050
ΔGW Δ plants
per year
ΔGW Deployment rate
relative to 2011
ΔGW Deployment rate
relative to 2011
World FullTech OPT (9) 511 [−37, 1357] 17 3455 [86, 6962] 53 1397 [449, 3032] 6
HST (7) 885 [191, 1995] 29 3329 [975, 18013] 51 1182 [245, 4081] 5
NucOff OPT (9) −177 [−286, −20] −6 3510 [77, 12759] 54 1308 [818, 3886] 5
HST (6) −164 [−286, −122] −5 4623 [1970, 34176] 71 1822 [1274, 5351] 8
LimSW OPT (6) 269 [33, 1318] 9 142 [−12, 4312] 2 534 [386, 2290] 2
HST (5) 387 [−86, 1290] 13 360 [14, 5969] 6 280 [−681, 2507] 1
LimBio OPT (5) 343 [−93, 1920] 11 4226 [3132, 8275] 65 1530 [1494, 4150] 6
HST (3) 545 [462, 2544] 18 8504 [3840, 8902] 131 2172 [2128, 7328] 9
NoCCS OPT (5) 1064 [−49, 2691] 35 5255 [3418, 18204] 81 1112 [1072, 4801] 5
HST (2) 3205 [2694, 3716] 107 23547 [5555, 41539] 362 3214 [2368, 4059] 14
OECD90 FullTech OPT (9) 70 [−203, 419] 2 785 [3, 1374] 12 243 [189, 1125] 1
HST (7) 102 [−106, 798] 3 853 [124, 6476] 13 200 [89, 1378] 1
NucOff OPT (9) −118 [−237, −17] −4 765 [3, 3466] 12 317 [231, 1089] 1
HST (6) −117 [−237, −89] −4 984 [186, 11120] 15 559 [315, 1611] 2
LimSW OPT (6) −28 [−212, 253] −1 −7 [−64, 888] 0 135 [−21, 906] 1
HST (5) −43 [−118, 256] −1 6 [−59, 1059] 0 120 [−313, 651] 1
LimBio OPT (5) 80 [−173, 325] 3 1262 [184, 2185] 19 207 [104, 1367] 1
HST (3) 130 [−17, 504] 4 1383 [245, 2312] 21 486 [306, 2587] 2
NoCCS OPT (5) 133 [−137, 605] 4 1617 [316, 9632] 25 123 [110, 1600] 1
HST (2) 950 [805, 1095] 32 7745 [428, 15061] 119 704 [349, 1060] 3
ASIA FullTech OPT (8) 497 [−24, 118] 17 1394 [16, 3712] 21 363 [139, 1194] 2
HST (6) 601 [158, 1055] 20 1794 [769, 8327] 28 368 [271, 1706] 2
NucOff OPT (8) −18 [−38, −1] −1 1562 [13, 7483] 24 498 [226, 1945] 2
HST (6) −18 [−38, −13] −1 2586 [1258, 18889] 40 550 [482, 2669] 2
LimSW OPT (5) 398 [128, 1033] 13 203 [0, 2242] 3 248 [30, 1154] 1
HST (4) 401 [197, 744] 13 671 [72, 3254] 10 128 [−26, 1212] 1
LimBio OPT (4) 681 [125, 1126] 23 2940 [2052, 4016] 45 573 [303, 1554] 2
HST (3) 316 [254, 1427] 11 4496 [2517, 4590] 69 888 [637, 3120] 4
NoCCS OPT (4) 792 [753, 1523] 26 3693 [2361, 6296] 57 395 [210, 1776] 2
HST (2) 1512 [1028, 1996] 50 8342 [3400, 13285] 128 618 [412, 823] 3
ROW FullTech OPT (9) 87 [−27, 268] 3 818 [14, 3064] 13 629 [8, 1327] 3
HST (7) 144 [−4, 336] 5 1021 [47, 3211] 16 503 [80, 997] 2
NucOff OPT (9) −21 [−48, −2] −1 865 [13, 2589] 13 644 [162, 1143] 3
HST (6) −21 [−42, 18] −1 1038 [88, 4167] 16 755 [213, 1070] 3
LimSW OPT (6) 111 [−21, 287] 4 42 [−1, 1182] 1 363 [227, 694] 2
HST (5) 74 [−12, 290] 2 91 [10, 1656] 1 157 [0, 644] 1
LimBio OPT (5) 42 [−4, 470] 1 2074 [887, 2961] 32 985 [801, 1323] 4
HST (3) 162 [161, 614] 5 2094 [1078, 2531] 32 1230 [754, 1621] 5
NoCCS OPT (5) 179 [88, 638] 6 2276 [1277, 2608] 35 904 [500, 1425] 4
HST (2) 743 [571, 916] 25 7460 [1728, 13192] 115 1892 [1197, 2587] 8
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although they do not agree whether energy demand will
exhibit the same behavior even before 2050. Note that energy
system transformation in GCAM is not very sensitive to the
future of renewables because of much larger emission
mitigation potential from BECCS. The post-2030 technology
deployment after weak near-term actions (LimSW-HST) is not
very different from the full technology availability case
(FullTech-HST).
4.3.3. Bioenergy limits
In the limited bioenergy scenario (LimBio-OPT), however,
all feasible models have immediate reductions in energy
demand relative to the full technology availability case
(Fig. S3). This is because they are required to cut emission
earlier as the negative emission option (BECCS) cannot be
exercised in a large scale (Fig. 1). Limiting bioenergy is costly
also because bioenergy is the most important source of
non-electric low-carbon energy [8]. The rapid near-term
emission reductions are achieved mainly by more rapidphase-out of conventional fossil energy and earlier deployment
of CCS-based fossil energy, and after 2030, solar and nuclear
power is put in to the system more rapidly. Also importantly,
the weak near-term actions with limited bioenergy supplies
(LimSW-HST) make post-2030 technology deployment even
more pronounced—more rapid phase-out of emitting sources
and earlier deployment of renewables—than the full technol-
ogy availability scenario (FullTech-HST).
4.3.4. CCS ban
The no CCS scenario (NoCCS-OPT) presents the greatest
departure from the behavior observed in the other technology
scenarios (Fig. S4). Emission reductions till 2030 are achieved
by slower build-up of emitting sources and earlier deployment
of bioenergy (w/o CCS) and solar power, collectively resulting
in immediate reductions in energy demand, which is more
pronounced than in the limited bioenergy case where the
negative emission option (BECCS) is suppressed because of
reduced feedstock availability but CCS technologies remain
available. Moreover, the 2030–2050 transition without CCS
82 J. Eom et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 73–88requires tremendously rapid deployment of low carbon
technologies (bioenergy w/o CCS, nuclear, and solar). In this
case, we move much more quickly toward low carbon sources
because of the complete absence of CCS (both BECCS and
FECCS), which is one of the most flexible de-carbonization
options. Not unexpectedly, the weak near-term actions
without CCS (NoCCS-HST) only amplify these effects, spanning
mostly in the short 2030–2050 period. The catch-up transfor-
mation is characterized by remarkably faster retirement in
emitting sources and a larger scale deployment of bioenergy
(w/o CCS), renewables, and nuclear power, which necessarily
leads to major reductions in energy demand even after 2030.
The 2030–2050 transition without CCS is less likely to succeed
as indicated by only two IAMs (DNE21+ and GCAM) with a
relatively large potential for technological responses remaining
feasible, suggesting that the risk of failing to achieve the
long-term climate goal will increase substantially especially
when strong policy actions are delayed without having CCS
available in the future. These twomodeling teams also reported
higher transition costs—for DNE21+, total energy system costs
increased 940% relative to the optimal near-term action case
(NoCCS-OPT).
5. Physical deployment in the 2030 to 2050 period: OPT
and HST
In preceding sections we discussed the speed of the
energy system transformation during the period 2030 to
2050. This 20-year period is critical to limiting cumulative
emissions to 1500 GtCO2 over the 21st century. The scale of
the energy system transition is large in physical terms as well
as relative terms. In this section, we focus on low-carbon
energy sources, such as nuclear, solar, wind, bioenergy, and
CCS, as the deployment of these technologies may pose
particularly big challenges in terms of resource requirements
and investment needs. Table 2 summarizes the scale of the
transition for nuclear, solar and wind deployments.
5.1. Nuclear power
In the OPT-FullTech scenario, the median of 340 1.5GWe
nuclear power plants would need to be built in the 20 years
between 2030 and 2050 (Table 2). In the NoCCS-HST scenario,
however, that number jumps to 2140 1.5GWe plants16 or at an
average rate of 107 new plants coming on line per year for
feasible models, a number roughly comparable to the entire
2010 United States fleet of nuclear power plants.
As long as CCS remains available, the myopic near-term
policy (HST)would lead to a faster expansion of nuclear power,
reaching up to the median of 580 1.5GWe plants globally over
the 20-year period or at an average rate of about 29 new plants16 Note that the number is the mean of the two models that remain feasible
under NoCCS-HST (GCAM and DNE21+). Even though both GCAM and
DNE21+ tend to have relatively rapid nuclear power deployment among all
feasible models (e.g., in the FullTech-OPT case, GCAM and DNE21+
projected 750 plants and 1330 plants, respectively in comparison of the
model median of 340 plants), the NoCCS-HST scenario still presents major
increases of the deployment of nuclear power plants for them.per year. Yet, this annual rate of upscaling is not unprecedented
and was observed in the mid-1980s [42]. One interesting
finding is that the models are generally more optimistic about
the future of nuclear power in ASIA than in other global regions
(Fig. S5) as its high population growth, rapid economic
development, and a lack of cheap technology alternatives all
make nuclear power as a promising option. This suggests that
losing the option of nuclear power would require faster
expansion in other low-carbon technologies for ASIA, as
supported by the region's large increase of solar and wind
power capacity in the no-new-nuclear case compared to the
full technology availability case (Fig. S5).
Without CCS, however, the median upscaling of nuclear
power plants ranges from about 700 to 2140 1.5GWe plants
globally over the 20-year period or at an average rate of 35 to
107 new plants per year, depending on the level of near-term
actions (Table 2). In particular, ASIA would have to upscale its
nuclear capacity with about 26 plants per year even in the
optimal case and about 50 plants per year in the HST policy
case. This is a substantial departure from the region's recent
past, but may not be unreasonable. For example, as of January
2013, China and India have planned 51 and 18 plants and
proposed 120 and 39 plants, respectively,17 even without any
major mitigation policies. However, the transformation in
OECD90 is likely to be difficult with the HST policy if without
CCS, as it would require an annual net build-up of 32 plants.
Given that many of nuclear power plants operating in
OECD90 will start to retire (there are only 5 plants under
construction and 33 plants planned), the post-2030 upscaling
of nuclear capacity would be challenging.5.2. Solar power
In the case of solar power, achieving the low stabilization
target after themyopic near-term actions implies up to 4 times
faster expansion between 2030 and 2050 than the optimal
policy case. This catch-up transformation is non-trivial,
demanding the median scale-up of about 50–360 times of
year-2011 global solar capacity over the 20-year period with
the fastest increase when a no-CCS world is doing less than
optimal in the near term (NoCCS-HST). This rate of upscaling
requires 0.6–4.5% of the size of current crop lands in such a
short period of time,18 which is a major shift even aside from
system integration and siting issues. However, the optimal
near-term policies require much slower upscaling over the
same period, ranging between 50 and 80 times of year-2011
global solar capacity with technology exclusion giving greater
increases. At the regional level, themost rapid build-up of solar
power takes place in ASIA and, to a lesser extent, in ROW. The
HST policy makes the split across the regions even more
pronouncedwith the annual percentage expansion rate of ASIA
and ROW reaching up to 30% (Fig. S5).17 World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements from World
Nuclear Association: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html.
18 The total global land area of 1.3 thousand km2 has been assumed for
year-2011 solar power based on CSP land requirement of about 2 km2 for a
100MWe plant [49].
Fig. 6. Global bioenergy production [EJ/year] as represented by feasible OPT scenarios (gray funnel) and feasible HST scenarios (orange funnel): Dotted lines
represent scenarios that are feasible only in the OPT case, but not in the HST case.
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The extent of upscaling is less pronounced in the case of
wind power than in the solar power case, in part due to the
higher starting value for wind, although the myopic near-term
policy may still claim 5–14 times of year-2011 global wind
capacity for the 2030–2050 transformation (Table 2). TheweakFig. 7. Annual rate of geological carbon sequestnear-term actions, except for the case with limited BECCS, do
not necessarily lead to particularly faster upscaling for wind
power than the optimal case. And technology exclusion does
not so much affect the rate of upscaling, which is also different
from the solar power case. It seems that wind power is the last
technology option to be exercised as a technology substitute.
Yet, the HST upscaling of wind power requires as much asration [GtCO2/year] under FullTech-OPT.
Fig. 8. Cumulative CO2 storage [GtCO2] from fossil energy CCS (upper) and bioenergy CCS (lower): Gray funnel indicates the range of feasible OPT scenarios, and
orange funnel indicates the range of feasible HST scenarios. Dotted lines represent scenarios that are feasible only in the OPT case, but not in the HST case.
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Fig. 9. Year-2100 cumulative storage of fossil energy CCS (FECCS) and bioenergy CCS (BECCS) in GtCO2 in various technology availability scenarios.
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period.19 At the regional level, the IAMs are generally more
optimistic about wind power expansion in ROW (Africa,
Middle East, Latin America, and Eastern Europe), than in
other global regions. Without CCS, ROW exhibits particularly
fast wind upscaling, requiring about 8 times upscaling of the
current wind capacity in the 2030–2050 period. The region's
annual percentage expansion rate is up to about 30%, which is
high but not unprecedented—this rate of wind power deploy-
ment was seen globally in the late 1990s, albeit with a smaller
base [43]. This suggests that, for ROW, CCS may be the major
post-2030mitigation strategy in the myopic policy action case,
so that losing this important option requires disproportionately
faster expansion in other low carbon sources such as nuclear
and wind in particular (Fig. S5).5.4. Commercial biomass
Achieving the 450 ppm CO2e target in 2100 without
limited bioenergy production may cause the demand for
commercial biomass to increase rapidly by 2050 relative to
its current level (Fig. 6), which would necessitate substan-
tial increases in lands for bioenergy crops. Without CCS
(NoCCS-OPT), in particular, bioenergy crop lands reach about
half the size of current crop lands by 2050 (5130 thousand km2
compared to 10,430 thousand km2) in the case of GCAM. This
considerable land expansion in the noCCS case is due to the call
to do more near-term emission reductions that are made
possible by faster upscaling of biomass production (Fig. S4). In
the other technology exclusion scenarios and the full technol-
ogy availability scenario, however, upscaling in commercial
biomass production by 2050 will be in many cases less than
seven times of the current production. This would require
much less land for bioenergy crops (2670 thousand km2 in
GCAM) compared to the case without CCS, resulting in less
damages to ecosystem.
The myopic near-term policy may require even faster
expansion in bioenergy production right after the policy
regime is strengthened, possibly doubling the rate of
post-2030 expansion if CCS is not available (Fig. 6). In GCAM
without CCS, the size of bioenergy crop lands increases five
times between 2030 and 2050 after the myopic actions
(NoCCS-HST), compared to the 2.5 times increase over the
same period in the optimal policy counterpart (NoCCS-OPT).
Note that a direct comparison across technology availability
scenarios may suffer from the varying number of feasible
IAMs. For example, both in the full technology availability
case (FullTech-HST) and in the limited renewable energy
case (LimSW-HST), MERGE-ETL exhibits the lowest biomass
production of all IAMs by 2050, although it does not report
any other HST scenarios. Nevertheless, the rapid post-2030
upscaling in biomass production and its land use requirements
would have the effect of raising the rental rate on land and thus
crop prices due to increased land use competition, damaging
the global poor and posing substantial social challenges.19 The total global land area of 47.6 thousand km2 has been assumed for
year-2011 wind power based on wind power spacing of 0.25 km2 per a
1MWe plant, which is the low end of the range that is often assumed in the
literature [50].5.5. CO2 capture and storage (CCS)
Achieving the 450 ppm CO2e stabilization requires not only
the rapid expansion of low-carbon technologies but also a
substantial growth of geological carbon sequestration through
CCS (Fig. 7). The magnitude of the scale-up challenges for CCS
grows with time. The required upscaling between 2008 and
2030 is indeed remarkable as CCS must increase by about 3
orders of magnitude from the current experimental CCS
facilities that store a total of 5MtCO2 per year. Yet, post-2030
upscaling in CCS is also extraordinary in terms of the growth in
scale—models project CO2 storage rates of about half to double
of current global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry by
2100.
The results indicate that achieving the 450 ppm CO2e
stabilization through CCS requires a large share of BECCS as
large as the demand for conventional fossil energy based CCS
(FECCS) (except for the limited bioenergy case) (Figs. 8 and 9).
This is because all IAMs treat BECCS, if available, as a major
mitigation option to achieve such an aggressive stabilization
target, offering flexibility in emission trajectories and helping
reduce policy costs. The IAMs also agree that, among the global
regions, ROW relies on BECCS themost, suggesting that limiting
BECCS might lead to a costly transformation particularly for
ROW. This is consistent with the region's high sensitivity of
wind and solar upscaling to the availability of BECCS (Fig. S5).
Interestingly, the myopic near-term actions shift the
allocation between the total demands for FECCS and BECCS
both globally and regionally, resulting in less FECCS and more
BECCS (Figs. 8 and 9). On the one hand, we have lower
demand for FECCS due to the delayed introduction of FECCS,
which later competes with renewable energy (including
BECCS) that becomes less expensive. On the other hand, they
tend to have higher demand for BECCS—greater negative
emissions—as the post-2030 catch-up is not sufficient
enough to get the emissions back on track.
Nevertheless, carbon storage resource itself is not likely to
limit the transformation even in the case where nuclear or
renewables are limited. Total global demand for CCS (FECCS
and BECCS combined) is far below the total CCS “Effective
Storage Capacity” estimate of 13,500 GtCO2 and even below
the “Practical Storage Capacity” estimate of 3900 GtCO2 (with
the land-based capacity of about 3100 GtCO2) [43]. Yet, it
does not necessarily imply that attendant CCS infrastructure
will be easy to establish. Social acceptance may also be
another important barrier to overcome as in the case of
nuclear power.
6. Conclusions and discussion
The AMPERE Work Package 2 model inter-comparison
study, which engaged nine participating integrated assessment
modeling teams, explored the implications of less-than-optimal
near-term emission mitigation for mid- and long-term transi-
tion pathways, which limit climate forcing to 450 ppm CO2e in
2100, and interactions with technology availability.
6.1. Findings
This study reaffirms two important findings. We found no
“Silver-Bullet” technology whose deployment accounted for
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other emission mitigation technologies. We also found that
multiple technology transition pathway portfolios could be
used to achieve the long term goal of low climate forcing.
The long-term goal, 450 ppm CO2e, was implemented as a
cumulative net emission limit of 1500 GtCO2 between 2000
and 2100. However, no limit was set on either annual or
cumulative emissions prior to the year 2100. That is, “over-
shoot” scenarios were allowed. Modeling teams reported
negative net global CO2 emissions when BECCS was available.
When BECCS was available, models used this option to exceed
the 1500 GtCO2 budget in the mid-term removing the excess
with BECCS in the long term. Excluding either bioenergy or
CCS limited the role of negative emissions and strongly shifted
emission mitigation toward the near-term. The foregone
long-term negative emission option greatly increased the risk
of failing to achieve the long-term climate goal, particularly
when combined with delayed near-term policy actions.
The study highlighted the critical importance of the
period between 2030 and 2050, in which the largest
percentage shift from emitting to non-emitting technology
occurs. Less-than-optimal emission mitigation in the peri-
od 2010 to 2030 simply increases the challenge in the
next 20 years, requiring even more rapid shifts toward
non-emitting energy technologies. We found that on
average 70% of the 1500 GtCO2 21st century emission budget
was used by the year 2030 and that the remainder of the
budget was allocated in the remaining 70 years. The absence
of a “Silver-Bullet” technology in achieving the long-term
climate goal points to the fact that a broad range of
responses will collectively make a major difference, sug-
gesting that global energy R&D programs need to take a
portfolio approachwith an emphasis on overall performance
of emission mitigation.
Against a background of less-than-optimal near-term
emission mitigation policies, technology deployment in the
2030 to 2050 time frame was greatly accelerated with nearly
all of the catch-up deployment made during this period. We
calculate physical deployment measures during this period
and show that, in some instances, when the use of CCS is
banned, deployment rates become extremely high if the
long-term goal is to be achieved. With the use of CCS banned,
2140 1.5GWe nuclear power plants would need to be built in
the 20 years between 2030 and 2050. Expansion rates for
other technologies are similarly pronounced. Global land
devoted to bioenergy production, for example, could be as
much as half the size of current crop lands by 2050 when CCS
was banned.
Renewable energy upscaling rates are also rapid. The
median 2030–2050 upscaling of solar power could be 50 to
360 times the year-2011 capacity level (5–14 times for wind
power). Although this result is sensitive to near-term policy
commitments, the highest rate of upscaling always occurs in
the case without CCS. Land requirements for the 2030–2050
solar power upscaling could amount to 0.6–4.5% of the size of
current crop lands (2.3–6.4% for wind power), which is not
trivial.
Expansion rates for CCS deployment, once made available,
were similarly dramatic. Models reported CO2 capture and
storage rates of more than tens of billion tons of CO2 per year
by the century-end from its current level of a fewmillion tonsof CO2 per year. Nevertheless, total demand for CCS would
remain well below the “Practical Storage Capacity” estimate
of potential geological CO2 repositories and would greatly
alleviate the challenges to mid- and long-term transitions to
limit climate forcing.
Like any other model comparison studies, the findings
from this research may be subject to limitations associated
with structural diversity among the participating IAMs.
Most importantly, they exhibit different reliance on various
mitigation responses—the upscaling of low-carbon technol-
ogies, the premature retirement of emitting sources, and the
associated reduction in energy demand—which led to some
models suggesting relatively easy technology-based solu-
tions but others suggesting failure to achieve the long-term
climate goal after the delayed policy actions. While not
investigated in this study, our results would be sensitive to
the degree to which installed coal capacity can be prema-
turely retired between 2030 and 2050 which varies among
the IAMs (see [39] in this issue). Further research is needed
to systematically explore the interaction between various
mitigation responses.
6.2. Future directions
While the AMPERE model comparison project has added
substantially to our understanding of the interactions between
technology and policy in limiting climate change, much
remains to be learned. Three potentially important extensions
of this work are:
• Consideration of a broader range of mitigation policies—in
this study we assume that all of the world's nations act in
unison using a common policy instrument, the common
carbon tax. The degree of coordination assumed here is
highly unlikely. Exploring combinations of delay in global
and regional participation is needed.
• Consideration of policy instruments in addition to the carbon
tax—for example, the European Union policy architecture
uses multiple instruments in combination. The research
questions include what such policies might imply for the
cost and effectiveness of achieving low stabilization (see for
example [36]).
• Consideration of demand-side technologies—in this study we
focused on the implications for the deployment of various
supply-side technologies. The required expansion in low-
carbon end-use technology alternatives, such as electric and
hybrid cars, electric heat pumps, and hydrogen-based tech-
nologies, might be equally challenging, and the rate would be
affected by the availability of major de-carbonization
options to the power and hydrogen system, most impor-
tantly, CCS.
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